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Abstract
We study the steady-state of a market with inﬂowing cohorts of buyers and sell-
ers who are randomly matched pairwise and bargain under private information. Two
bargaining protocols are considered: take-it-or-leave-it oﬀering and the double auction.
There are frictions due to costly search and time discounting, parameterized by a single
number τ>0 proportional to the waiting time until the next meeting. We study the
eﬃciency of these mechanisms as the frictions are removed, i.e. τ → 0.W eﬁnd that all
equilibria of the take-it-or-leave-it oﬀering mechanism converge to the Walrasian limit,
at the fastest possible rate O(τ) among all bargaining mechanisms. For the double
auction mechanism, we ﬁnd that there are equilibria that converge at the linear rate,
those that converge at a slower rate or even not converge at all.
Keywords: Matching and Bargaining, Search, Double Auctions, Foundations for
Perfect Competition, Rate of Convergence
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: C73, C78, D83.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
A number of papers in the literature on dynamic matching and bargaining have shown that,
as frictions vanish, equilibria converge to perfect competition.1 But it is also important to
know how rapidly the equilibria converge. To our knowledge, this question has not been
addressed in the literature.
In contrast, the rate of convergence to eﬃciency has been the focus of the literature
on static double auctions. In particular, Rustichini, Satterthwaite, and Williams (1994)
∗We thank Mike Peters, Mark Satterthwaite, and seminar participants at Northwestern, SFU and UWO
for helpful comments. We thank SSHRC for ﬁnancial support made available through grants 12R27261 and
12R27788.
1Papers that address convergence include Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985), Gale (1986), Gale (1987),
Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1990), Mortensen and Wright (2002), and, with private information, Butters
(1979), Wolinsky (1988), De Fraja and Sakovics (2001), Serrano (2002), Lauermann (2006), Satterthwaite
and Shneyerov (2007), Atakan (2007), Shneyerov and Wong (2007).
1show robust convergence of double-auction equilibria in the symmetric class at the fast rate
O(1/n) for the bid/oﬀer strategies and the superfast rate O
¡
1/n2¢
for the ex-ante traders’
welfare, where n is the number of traders in the market.2 Moreover, the double auction
converges at the rate that is fastest among all incentive-compatible and individually rational
mechanisms (Satterthwaite and Williams (2002); Tatur (2005)). Cripps and Swinkels (2005)
substantially enrich the model by allowing correlation among bidders’ valuations, and show
convergence at the rate O
¡
1/n2−ε¢
,w h e r eε>0 is arbitrary small. Reny and Perry (2006)
allow interdependent values and show that it is almost eﬃcient and almost fully aggregates
information as n →∞ .
In this paper, we ﬁll this gap by proving a rate of convergence result for a decentralized
model of trade. We study the steady state of a market with continuously inﬂowing cohorts
of buyers and sellers who are randomly matched pairwise and bargain under private infor-
mation. The model is therefore in continuous time and is a replica of Mortensen and Wright
(2002), but with private information. (In a companion paper Shneyerov and Wong (2007),
this model is looked at from a diﬀerent perspective; in particular, we prove existence and
show that private information may be welfare enhancing.)
Our baseline model considers the take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer protocol in which seller makes
an oﬀer with probability α (and the buyer makes an oﬀer with a complementary probabil-
ity).3 There are frictions due to costly search and time discounting. We parameterize these
frictions by a single number τ>0 proportional to the waiting time until the next meeting.4
T h ei n v e r s eo fτ can also be interpreted as a measure of (local) market size that analogous
to the number of traders n in the centralized double auction literature.
We show that price range collapses to the Walrasian price and ineﬃciency vanishes at the
linear rate as the frictions are removed, i.e. τ → 0. Moreover, we derive explicit bounds on
the diﬀerence between traders’ strategies (and hence welfare) and their competitive limits,
for all τ. We show that these bounds become tight as the discount rate becomes small
relative to the search costs.
Thus all nontrivial equilibria converge rapidly to Walrasian benchmark. Using the
notion of worst-case asymptotic optimality similar to Satterthwaite and Williams (2002),
we show that the take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer mechanism is worst-case asymptotic optimal: in
terms of the welfare, the rate of convergence cannot be faster under any other bargaining
mechanism (and even under full information as in Mortensen and Wright (2002)).5
As a robustness check, we also study the rate of convergence of the double auction
mechanism. We ﬁnd that equilibria can be either convergent at the linear rate, convergent
at a slower than linear rate or even divergent. This result can be compared to the ﬁndings
in Serrano (2002). In a dynamic setting, Serrano (2002) studies a mechanism that in some
2See also Gresik and Satterthwaite (1989), Satterthwaite and Williams (1989), Satterthwaite (1989),
Williams (1991).
3Under full information, this model corresponds to the Nash bargaining solution. It is used extensively
in labor market search models For a recent survey, see Rogerson, Shimer, and Wright (2005).
4Our parameter τ therefore corresponds to the period between matches as in the discrete time models,
e.g. Satterthwaite and Shneyerov (2007).
5The notion of the “worst case” here is actually weaker because we only look at the most unfavorable
equilibrium; all our results are for ﬁxed distributions of traders’ types. The deﬁnition of the worst case
in Satterthwaite and Williams (2002) involves also searching for most unfavorable distributions of traders’
types.
2respects resembles a double auction (the set of bids is restricted to be a ﬁnite grid) and
ﬁnds that “as discounting is removed, equilibria with Walrasian and non-Walrasian features
persist”.6 Serrano points out, however, that “after removing the ﬁnite sets of traders’ types
and of allowed prices, the present model conﬁrms Gale’s one-price result and has a strong
Walrasian ﬂavor”. We, on the other hand, ﬁnd that in our model, non-convergent equilibria
exist even if the bargaining protocol is the “unrestricted” double auction.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the baseline model with
take-it-or-leave-it bargaining mechanism. Section 3 presents the elementary properties of
equilibria of the baseline model. Section 4 derives the convergence rate to perfect competi-
tion as frictions are removed. Section 5 gives our worst-case asymptotic optimality result for
the take-it-or-leave-it bargaining mechanism. Section 6 discussed necessary changes to the
model for the double auction, presents and proves all the results for it. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Baseline Model
The players of our baseline model are potential buyers and potential sellers of a homoge-
neous, indivisible good. Each buyer has a unit demand for the good, while each seller is
able to produce one unit of the good. Potential buyers are heterogeneous in their valua-
tions (or types) v over the good. Potential sellers are also heterogeneous in their costs (or
types) c of producing the good. For simplicity, we assume v,c ∈ [0,1]. Time is continuous
and inﬁnite horizon. The details of the model are described as follows:
• Entry: Potential buyers and potential sellers are continuously born at rate b and s
respectively. The type of a new-born buyer is drawn i.i.d. from the c.d.f. F(v) and
the type of a new-born seller is drawn i.i.d. from the c.d.f. G(c). Each trader’s
type will not change once it is drawn. Entry (or participation, or being active) is
voluntary. Each potential trader decides whether to enter the market once they are
born. Those who does not enter will get zero payoﬀ. Those who enter must incur the
participation cost continuously at the rate κB for buyers and κS for sellers, until they
leave the market.
• Matching: Active buyers and active sellers are randomly and continuously matched
pairwise with the rate of matching given by a matching function M(B,S)/τ,w h e r eB
and S are the masses of active buyers and active sellers currently in the market, and
τ is a parameter proportional to the waiting time of a trader until the next meeting.
• Bargaining: Once a pair of buyer and seller is matched, they bargain over the trading
decision and the term of trade without observing the type of their partner. The
bargaining protocol is take-it-or-leave-it oﬀering: either the seller or the buyer, called
proposer, makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer and the other party, called responder, either
accept or reject the oﬀer. With probability α ∈ (0,1) (independent across pairs), the
seller makes the oﬀer; with probability 1 − α, the buyer makes the oﬀer.
6This simpliﬁed bargaining mechanism was introduced in Wolinsky (1990) and also used in Blouin and
Serrano (2001).
3• If a type v buyer and a type c seller successfully trade at a price p, then they leave the
market with (current value) payoﬀ v −p,a n dp−c respectively. If the matched pair
fails to trade, both traders can either stay in the market waiting for another match
(and incur the participation costs) as if they were never matched, or simply exit and
never come back. The instantaneous discount rate is r ≥ 0.
We make the following assumptions on the primitives of our model.
Assumption (distributions of inﬂow types) The cumulative distributions F(v) and
G(c) of inﬂow types have densities f(v) and g(c) on (0,1), bounded away from 0 and
∞: 0 <f≤ f(v) ≤ ¯ f<∞, 0 <g≤ g(c) ≤ ¯ g<∞.
Assumption (matching function) The matching function M is continuous on R2
++,
nondecreasing in each argument, constant returns to scale (i.e. homogeneous of degree
one), and satisﬁes limB→0 M (B,S)=l i m S→0 M (B,S)=0 .
The matching technology is parametrized by τ, the parameter proportional to a trader’s
waiting time until next meeting. To see why this interpretation is correct, notice that,
given steady-state active trader masses B and S, trading opportunities for a buyer arrive
at the Poisson rate M (B,S)/(τB), and therefore the waiting time until the next meeting
is exponentially distributed with mean τ ·B/M (B,S).7 Similarly, the waiting time for the
seller is exponentially distributed with mean τ · S/M (B,S).
The inverse of τ can also be interpreted as a measure of market size that analogous to
the number of traders n in the centralized double auction literature. To see why, recall
that in a centralize market, traders are competing intratemporally with all other traders
in the same side. On the contrary, in the dynamic matching environment here, traders,
whenever they bargain with their partners, are not directly competing with all other traders
in the same side because of the matching frictions. But they do intertemporally compete
with others in the sense that their partners have the option to search another to trade with.
Since 1/τ is proportional to arrival rates, it measures the local market size that corresponds
this intertemporal competition.
This parameter, τ, is crucial for us since we are interested in the limit of our bilateral
matching and bargaining game as τ → 0, i.e. as matching becomes frictionless.8




be the steady-state ratio of buyers to sellers (or market tightness), and deﬁne
m(ζ) ≡ M(ζ,1).
Since the matching technology is assumed to be constant returns to scale, it is easy to see
that m(ζ) is also equal to M (B,S)/S, the probability that a seller is matched over a short
7See Karlin and Taylor (1975), p. 124.
8All of our results hold equally well if we ﬁx τ and let r, κB and κS tend to 0 proportionally, instead of
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() 0 : Exit = v B χ
Figure 1: Markov chain of a buyer
time period of length dt divided by dt. Similarly, m(ζ)/ζ is equal to M (B,S)/B,t h e
probability that a buyer is matched over a over a short time period of length dt divided by
dt.N o t et h a tm(ζ) and m(ζ)/ζ are nondecreasing and nonincreasing respectively in ζ,a n d
m is continuous on R++. In this notation, the Poisson arrival rates for buyers and sellers
become
 B (ζ,τ) ≡
m(ζ)
τζ




Notice that an uninteresting no-trade equilib r i u ma l w a y se x i s t si nw h i c ha l lp o t e n t i a l
traders do not enter. In the following, we will study steady-state market equilibria in which
positive trade occurs. Let us simply call them nontrivial steady-state equilibria.
We now proceed to the deﬁnition of a nontrivial steady-state equilibrium of our baseline
model. It is useful to represent each trader’s world as a continuous-time Markov chain,
as shown in Figure 1 for buyers. A trader is born into the “inactive” state, and has
to decide immediately whether to enter to the market and search a partner, or simply
exit. Let χB :[ 0 ,1] → {0,1} and χS :[ 0 ,1] → {0,1} be the buyers’ and sellers’ entry-
decision functions in the inactive state. For example, χB(v)=1means type v buyer enters;
χS(c)=0means type c seller does not enter. Let AB ⊂ [0,1] and AS ⊂ [0,1] be the sets of
active buyers’ and sellers’ types, i.e.
AB ≡ {v ∈ [0,1] : χB(v)=1 },
AS ≡ {c ∈ [0,1] : χS(c)=1 }.
Once in the “searching” state, the trader waits until a new trading opportunity arrives.
This happens after a time period of random length t has elapsed. (Recall that this length t
is exponentially distributed with mean 1/ B for buyers and 1/ S for sellers.) The arrival of
5a trading opportunity moves a trader from the searching state to the “matched” state. Once
in the matched state, the trader immediately proceeds either to the proposing state (with
probability α for sellers and 1 − α for buyers), or to the responding state (with the com-
plimentary probabilities). Let pB(v) and pS(c) be the proposing strategies used by buyers
and sellers respectively.9 Similarly, let ˜ v(v) and ˜ c(c) be the acceptance levels, characterizing
the responding strategies of buyers and sellers respectively. Precisely, in a proposing state,
type v buyers will propose the trading price pB(v), while in a responding state, they will
accept a proposed price p i fa n do n l yi f˜ v(v) ≥ p. Analogous meanings apply to pS(c) and
˜ c(c).
In the event when trading is successful, the matched pair leaves the market forever with
their realized gains from trade. If trading is unsuccessful, each trader is immediately back
in the inactive state of her Markov chain and the cycle repeats.
Let Φ(v),Γ(c) be the (endogenous) steady-state cumulative distributions of types of
buyers and sellers who are active. The equilibria of our model can be deﬁned as a collection10
E ≡ {χB,χ S,p B,p S, ˜ v,˜ c,B,S,Φ,Γ}
such that:
(i) given the relevant beliefs made from E, every potential and active buyers (resp.
sellers) ﬁnd the entry policy given by χB (resp. χS), the proposing policy pB(·) (resp.
pS(·)) and the responding policy characterized by ˜ v(·) (resp. ˜ c(·))t ob et h e i ro p t i m a l
strategies sequentially;
(ii) E generates B,S,Φ,Γ in steady state.
The mathematical conditions for our equilibrium are as follows. Let us consider the
sequential optimality of the responding strategies ﬁrst. Let WB(v) be the (steady-state)
equilibrium continuation payoﬀ of a type v buyer in her inactive state, and let WS(c) be
the equilibrium continuation payoﬀ of a type c seller in her inactive state. Pick a type v
buyer.11 If she is in her responding state with an oﬀer p at hand, her continuation payoﬀ
is max{v − p,WB(v)}.T h e ﬁrst element v − p is the continuation payoﬀ if she accepts
the oﬀer p, while the second element WB(v) is the continuation payoﬀ if she rejects and
hence immediately get back to the inactive state. Similar logic applies to sellers’ situation.
Therefore, sequential optimality in the responding states requires the acceptance levels to
be equal to what we shall call dynamic types12
˜ v(v) ≡ v − WB (v), (1)
˜ c(c) ≡ c + WS (c). (2)
Our dynamic type functions ˜ v(v) and ˜ c(c) allow us to characterize the proposing strate-
gies in a simple manner. To this end, it is useful to consider the distributions of traders’
9Implicitly, every traders are assumed to use symmetric pure strategies. However, it is essentially without
loss of generality. See Shneyerov and Wong (2007) for details.
10This deﬁnition is similar to the one in Satterthwaite and Shneyerov (2007).
11This type v buyer could be either active or not. If she is not active, we are considering an oﬀ-equilibrium
path.
12The notion of dynamic types is due to Satterthwaite and Shneyerov (2007).









Consider the situation where a type v buyer is in a proposing state and suppose sellers use
their equilibrium responding policy characterized by ˜ c(c) and sellers’ distribution is at the
equilibrium value Γ. If the buyer propose λ (one can think λ as a one-shot deviation) and
this oﬀer is accepted, her continuation payoﬀ will be v − λ; and if her oﬀer is rejected, she
will be back to the inactive state immediately and her continuation payoﬀ would be WB(v).







which can be rewritten as
˜ Γ(λ)[˜ v(v) − λ]+WB(v).
Only the ﬁrst term, which is the “capital gain part”, depends on λ. Similar logic applies to




˜ Γ(λ)[˜ v(v) − λ], (5)
pS(c) ∈ argmax
λ
[1 − ˜ Φ(λ)][λ − ˜ c(c)]. (6)
It follows that the equilibrium proposing strategies are determined as best-responses in the
static monopoly problems where the distributions of responders’ types are replaced by the
distributions of the responders’ dynamic types and the proposers’ types are replaced by
the proposers’ dynamic types. As we have seen, this principle applies to the responding
strategies as well. In general, the bargainers behave as if they are in a one-shot game with
their types replaced by their dynamic types. Intuitively, trading with current partner lead
a trader to give up the opportunity of searching and trading with another partner. Our
dynamic type notions are simply adjusted with the traders’ opportunity cost of further
searching. This observation plays a very important role in both intuition and proofs of our
results.
Turn to the matched state. Suppose that all traders always use their prescribed equilib-
rium strategies, {χB,χ S,p B,p S, ˜ v,˜ c} and that the stationary distributions of active seller
and buyer types are at their equilibrium values Γ and Φ.T h e nat y p ev buyer’s expected
bargaining surplus from the meeting is equal to






[v − pS(c)]dΓ(c). (7)
Further denote







7the buyer’s probability of a successful trade in a given meeting. With probability 1−qB (v),
the bargaining turn unsuccessful. The buyer’s Markov chain then moves to the inactive
state, giving a continuation payoﬀ WB(v).
Now suppose a type v buyer chooses to enter, she has to wait and stay in the searching
state until the next meeting. Since the buyer’s waiting time before her next meeting is ex-
ponentially distributed with mean 1/ B,13 the discounted value of one dollar to be received




e−rtd(1 − e− B(ζ,τ)·t)=
 B(ζ,τ)
r +  B(ζ,τ)
. (9)









d(1 − e− B(ζ,τ)·t)=
κB
r +  B(ζ,τ)
. (10)
Then the searching state continuation payoﬀ, provided that the type v buyer enters, is
RB(ζ,τ)[ΠB(v)+( 1− qB(v))WB(v)] − KB(ζ,τ).
Since the entry decision is made in the inactive state and the trader gets 0 if she exits,
the inactive state continuation payoﬀ, WB(v), must satisfy the following recursive equation:
WB(v)=m a x{RB(ζ,τ)[ΠB(v)+( 1− qB(v))WB(v)] − KB(ζ,τ),0} (11)
where the ﬁrst maximand represents the payoﬀ for entry, the second represents the payoﬀ
for exiting. Solve (11) for WB(v), we obtain an equivalent ratio-form formula:
WB(v)=m a x
½
 B(ζ,τ)ΠB(v) − κB




Therefore, the buyers’ sequentially optimal entry policy in the inactive state is
χB(v)=I { B(ζ,τ)ΠB(v) ≥ κB} (13)
where I (·) is the indicator function. Note that (13) implicitly assumes that traders enter if
they are indiﬀerent between entering or not. This is only for expositional simplicity because
it turns out that the set of such indiﬀerent traders is of measure 0.





[pS(c) − c]dΦ(v)+( 1− α)
Z
pB(v)≥˜ c(c)








13That is, the distribution function of waiting time t is 1 − exp(− Bt).
8RS(ζ,τ)=
 S(ζ,τ)
r +  S(ζ,τ)
,K S(ζ,τ)=
κS
r +  S(ζ,τ)
. (16)
Then we have the recursive equation for WS:
WS(c)=m a x{RS(ζ,τ)[ΠS(c)+( 1− qS(c))WS(c)] − KS(ζ,τ),0}, (17)
and the sellers’ sequentially optimal entry policy in the inactive state is
χS(c)=I { S(ζ,τ)ΠS(c) ≥ κS}. (18)
This completes the description of the strategic part of a nontrivial steady-state equi-
librium. To complete the description of nontrivial steady-state equilibrium, we turn to the
steady state equations for the distributions of active buyer and seller types Φ and Γ and
active trader masses B and S. In a steady-state market equilibrium, traders who once enter














qS(x)dΓ(x) ∀c ∈ [0,1], (20)
which simply state that the inﬂow rate of every types of traders must be equal to the
corresponding outﬂow rate.
These preparations allow us to formally deﬁne nontrivial steady-state equilibrium as
follows.
Deﬁnition 1 Ac o l l e c t i o nE ≡ {χB,χ S,p B,p S, ˜ v,˜ c,B,S,Φ,Γ} is a nontrivial steady-state
equilibrium if there exists a pair of equilibrium payoﬀ functions {WB,W S} such that the
proposing strategies pB and pS, responding strategies ˜ v and ˜ c, entry strategies χB and
χS satisfy the sequential optimality conditions (5), (6), (1), (2), (13) and (18),a n dt h e
distributions of active buyer and seller types Φ and Γ and active trader masses B and S
solve the steady-state equations (19) and (20),a n dt h ep a y o ﬀ functions WB and WS solve
the recursive equations (11) and (17).
3 Basic Properties of Equilibria
We will need the following equilibrium properties from our companion paper Shneyerov
and Wong (2007). Here, we give a proof that is diﬀerent because of its connection to some
other results in this paper.
Lemma 2 In any nontrivial steady-state equilibrium, WB(v) and WS(c) are absolutely con-





r +  BqB (x)





r +  SqS (x)
dx for all c ∈ [0,¯ c]. (22)
9The sets of active trader types are AB =[ v,1] and AS =[ 0 ,¯ c]. The probabilities of trading
are monotonic: qB(v) is nondecreasing in v on AB,w h i l eqS(c) is nonincreasing in c on
AS.T h ed y n a m i ct y p e s˜ v(v)=v − WB(v) and ˜ c(c)=c + WS(c) are absolutely continuous
and nondecreasing. Their slopes are
˜ v0(v)=
r
r +  BqB (v)
(a.e. v ∈ AB) (23)
˜ c0(c)=
r
r +  SqS (v)
(a.e. c ∈ AS). (24)
Proof: We prove the results for buyers only. Rewrite the recursive equation for the











[ˆ ΠB(v − WB(v),ˆ v)+WB(v)] − KB,0
¾
where
ˆ ΠB(v,ˆ v) ≡ qB(ˆ v)v − tB(ˆ v),







If RB =1(or r =0 ), the recursive equation indicate that whenever WB(v) 6=0 ,
we have maxˆ v∈[0,1] ˆ ΠB(v − WB(v), ˆ v)=KB > 0 so that v − WB(v) must be some positive
constant x. It is then easily seen that the recursive equation has a unique solution WB(v)=
max{v − x,0}, which is nondecreasing, continuous and convex.
Now suppose RB < 1 (or r>0). Then the right-hand side of the recursive equation
can be regarded as a contraction mapping that assigns each WB another function on the
same domain. Applying standard techniques of discounted dynamic programming, we can
see that the solution WB is unique, nondecreasing, continuous and convex.
Then from continuity and monotonicity, WB(v) is absolutely continuous and hence dif-














r +  BqB(v)
.
It then follows from the convexity of WB that qB is nondecreasing on AB.
For v ∈ AB, the trading probability qB(v) must be strictly positive, otherwise the
participation cost κB cannot be recovered. Thus WB(v) is strictly increasing on AB and
AB =[ v,1].
14See e.g. Milgrom and Segal (2002).
10In order to prove (21),i tn o ws u ﬃces to show WB(v)=0 . Indeed, if WB(v) 6=0 ,t h e n
either v =0or v =1 . We preclude the possibility of v =1b e c a u s ew ea r el o o k i n ga t
nontrivial equilibrium. v =0is also impossible because in that case type 0 buyer cannot
expect their participation cost recovered.
It follows from its deﬁnition that ˜ v is absolutely continuous because WB is. Its derivative,
which exists almost everywhere on AB,i sg i v e nb y(23), which are non-negative. Q.E.D.
Shneyerov and Wong (2007) also show that the proposing strategies are monotone.
Lemma 3 In any nontrivial steady-state equilibrium, the proposing strategies pB and pS
are nondecreasing on AB and AS respectively.
Since the dynamic opportunity costs of trading for marginal entrants are zero (i.e.
WB(v)=WS(¯ c)=0 ), we can see that the marginal participating types are equal to the
corresponding dynamic types:
¯ c =˜ c(¯ c),v =˜ v(v).
The sellers’ minimum acceptable price c and the buyers’ maximum acceptable price ¯ v are
deﬁned by:
c ≡ inf
c {˜ c(c):c ∈ AS} =˜ c(0),
¯ v ≡ sup
v
{˜ v(v):v ∈ AB} =˜ v(1),
which, taken together deﬁne what we call the acceptance interval [c, ¯ v]. The smallest and
largest oﬀers by buyers and sellers are
pB ≡ inf
v {pB(v):v ∈ AB} = pB (v),
¯ pB ≡ sup
v
{pB(v):v ∈ AB} = pB (¯ v),
pS ≡ inf
c {pS(c):c ∈ AS} = pS (c),
¯ pS ≡ sup
c
{pS(c):c ∈ AS} = pS (¯ c).
We deﬁne the price interval as [pB, ¯ pS].
Lemma 4 In any nontrivial steady-state equilibrium, ˜ c(c) <p S(c) and pB(v) < ˜ v(v) for
all c ∈ [0,¯ c] and all v ∈ [v,1].( T h e y i m p l y pB <vand ¯ c<¯ pS.) Moreover, if r>0,t h e n
c <v≤ pS ≤ ¯ pS < ¯ v and c <p B ≤ ¯ pB ≤ ¯ c<¯ v,w h i l ei fr =0 ,t h e nc <v= pS =¯ pS =¯ v
and c = pB =¯ pB =¯ c<¯ v.
The proof of Lemma 4 is again in Shneyerov and Wong (2007). In particular, in equilib-
rium, the buyers’ oﬀers must be lower than their dynamic opportunity valuation, and the
sellers’ oﬀers must be higher than their dynamic opportunity cost. Moreover, buyers never
propose anything below the lowest acceptable price of sellers c, and sellers never propose
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Figure 2: A full-trade equilibrium
˜ v(v) and ¯ v ≥ pS (c) > ˜ c(c). Furthermore, in order for the marginal entrants to recover
participation costs, we must also have c <vand ¯ c<¯ v.
In our companion paper Shneyerov and Wong (2007), we identify two kinds of equilibria:
full-trade equilibria and non-full-trade equilibria. In a full-trade equilibrium, every meeting
results in a trade. It can be deﬁned as a nontrivial steady-state equilibrium with pB =¯ c
and ¯ pS = v, see Figure 2. In a non-full-trade equilibrium, not every meeting results in a
trade; see Figure 3. In Shneyerov and Wong (2007), we prove the existence of both kinds
of equilibria.
4 Rate of Convergence for Strategies
Before we prove our general rate of convergence theorem, we show how the linear rate
is obtained for full-trade equilibrium. This can be done in a simple manner because a
full-trade equilibrium admits a simple characterization.
The marginal participating types v and ¯ c must satisfy the following two equations
 B(ζ,τ)(1 − α)(v − ¯ c)=κB, (25)
 S(ζ,τ)α(v − ¯ c)=κS. (26)
The intuition here is as follows. In the left-hand sides of equations (25) and (26) we have
marginal traders’ expected proﬁts from trading, gross of participation costs, over a short
period dt, divided by the length of the period. To see the intuition behind equation (25),
note that a marginal participating buyer v makes positive proﬁt only if he meets a seller,
proposes, and his oﬀer is accepted (the combined probability is  B·(1−α)), and conditional
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Figure 3: A non-full-trade equilibrium
v − pB. Similar logic applies to equation (26).15
Since traders always exit in pairs, in steady state the marginal participating types also
satisfy the mass balance condition
b[1 − F(v)] = sG(¯ c), (27)
which states that inﬂow rates of buyers and sellers are equal.
Equations (25)-(27) fully characterize a full-trade equilibrium, if it ever exists.16 Notic-
ing that  S(ζ,τ)/ B(ζ,τ)=ζ, the entry equations (25) and (26) can be easily solved for ζ



















It follows from (29) that the entry gap v − ¯ c converges to 0 at the linear rate in τ.F r o m
Lemma 2, since qB (v)=qS (c)=1and ζ = z in the full-trade equilibrium, the slopes of
15These equations follow from Lemma 7 below.
16However, to verify that the solution of (25)-(27) is really an equilibrium, one has to ensure that (a)
τ · K (z) < 1, (b) buyers do not have an incentive to propose higher than ¯ c, and (c) sellers do not have an
incentive to propose below v. See Shneyerov and Wong (2007) for details.
13responding strategies also converge to 0 linearly in τ. Consequently, the acceptance interval
¯ v − c converges at that rate as well.
Our main contribution is to show that all equilibria (i.e. also non-full-trade) converge
at the linear rate in τ. Our main result is the following theorem.
Theorem 5 (Rate of convergence for strategies) In any nontrivial steady-state equi-
librium, we have







where κ ≡ min{κB,κ S}.
Notice that the upper bound provided in Theorem 5 converges to the lower bound as
r gets small relative to κ ≡ min{κB,κ S}. It indicates that our bounds are tight at least
when the discount rate is small relative to the search costs.17
The main diﬃculty with the proof is that there is no simple characterization of a non-
full-trade equilibrium, even though, it is relatively easy to show that, as in the full-trade
equilibrium, the entry gap is O(τ).18
Lemma 6 (Rate of convergence for entry gap) In any nontrivial steady-state equilib-
rium, we have
max{v − ¯ c,0} ≤ τ · K (z). (30)
Nevertheless, we know of no simple argument that would show that the slopes of re-
sponding strategies converge to 0 as τ → 0 uniformly over all types. A diﬃculty arises
because we would need to bound the trading probabilities  B (ζ,τ)qB (v) and  S (ζ,τ)qS (c)
away from 0 uniformly as τ → 0. Our proof avoids this diﬃc u l t yb yl o o k i n ga tac a r e f u l l y
chosen set of types where such bounding can be done.
To continue, we need the following lemma that describes the indiﬀerence conditions for
marginal entrants.
Lemma 7 In any nontrivial steady-state equilibrium,
 B(ζ,τ)(1 − α)˜ Γ(pB)(v − pB)=κB (31)
 S(ζ,τ)α[1 − ˜ Φ(¯ pS)](¯ pS − ¯ c)=κS. (32)
17In the Appendix, we provide completely analogous rate of convergence result in the context
of full information. The Appendix is available in the longer on-line version of the paper, at
www.econ.ubc.ca/sart/homepage.htm. In particular, we show that the rate of convergence is exactly the
same under full information bargaining. Furthermore, the results in the next section also hold under full
information.
18Lemma 6 and Lemma 7 are from Shneyerov and Wong (2007); we give the proofs here for the sake of
completeness. We postpone the proof of Lemma 6 till we prove Lemma 7.
14Proof: Notice that by Lemma 4, v ≤ pS and therefore a v-buyer could make positive
proﬁt only when he is the proposer. When he is a proposer, his oﬀer pB will be accepted
only if the seller’s dynamic type ˜ c(c) ≤ pB. The entry condition (13) then implies (31).
Similar logic leads to (32). Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fL e m m a6 :We will apply a revealed preference argument to the entry condi-
tions (31) and (32). Consider the deviations in which the v-buyers propose ¯ c and ¯ c-sellers
propose v.T h o s em a r g i n a le n t r a n t sm u s tn o tb ea b l et oh a v es t r i c t l yp o s i t i v ep a y o ﬀ from
such deviations:
(1 − α) B (v − ¯ c) ≤ κB,
α S (v − ¯ c) ≤ κS.
It follows that
v − ¯ c ≤ min
½
κB






≤ τ · K (z).
The last inequality follows from the fact that κS
 Sα is nonincreasing and κB
 B(1−α) is nonde-
creasing in ζ, and that they are equal if and only if ζ = z, at which both of them equal
τ · K (z). Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m5 :
Step 1:W ec l a i mt h a t
(a):
v − c





¯ v − ¯ c





We provide the proof for part (a) only. The proof for part (b) is the ﬂip of that for part
(a). Apply (31) and notice that qB(v) ≥ (1 − α)˜ Γ(pB) > 0 whenever v ∈ [v,1],a n dt h a t




r +  BqB(v)
≤
r
r + κB/(v − c)
.
Hence





r + κB/(v − c)
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¯ v − c
=
1









Step 2:W ec l a i mt h a t
(a): min{v,¯ c} − c ≤
4r(r + κB)
 SακB
15(b): ¯ v − max{v,¯ c} ≤
4r(r + κS)
 B(1 − α)κS
.
Again by symmetry, we only provide a proof for (a). Let y ≡ min{v,¯ c} − c.
Consider a type c seller with ˜ c(c) ≤ c + y/2,t h e n
h
1 − ˜ Φ(pS(c))
i
[pS(c) − ˜ c(c)] = max
λ
nh
1 − ˜ Φ(λ)
i












Consequently, that seller’s probability of trade in a given meeting, qS (c), is bounded from
below by
qS (c) ≥ α[1 − ˜ Φ(pS(c))] ≥
α












The last inequality is from step 1(a).
Then from (24) in Lemma 2,
˜ c0 (c)=
r
r +  SqS (c)
≤
2r(r + κB)

















which is the same as (a).
Step 3:L e tκ be min{κB,κ S}.W ec l a i mt h a t
¯ v − c ≤ τ · min
½
κB
















To prove it, ﬁr s tn o t i c et h a tf r o ms t e p2 ( a )a n d(33),w eh a v e







Then from step 1(a),
¯ v − c ≤
r + κB
κB





















































Similarly, from step 2(b), inequality (33) and step 1(b),
¯ v − c ≤
κB











16We get our claim by combining these two upper bounds of ¯ v − c.
Step 4:W ec l a i mt h a t






 B (1 − α)
¾
.
To prove it, observe that (31), (32) and Lemma 4 imply
κB ≤  B(1 − α)(v − pB) ≤  B(1 − α)(¯ pS − pB),
κS ≤  Sα(¯ pS − ¯ c) ≤  Sα(¯ pS − pB),
and ¯ pS − pB ≤ ¯ v − c.
Step 5:N o t i c et h a tκS
 Sα is nonincreasing and κB
 B(1−α) is nondecreasing in ζ,a n dt h a t







 B (1 − α)
¾






 B (1 − α)
¾
.
Then from steps 3 and 4,


















We deﬁne the Walrasian price p∗ as the price that clears the ﬂows of the arriving cohorts:
b[1 − F (p∗)] = sG(p∗).
Then as a corollary of Theorem 5, traders’ proposing and responding strategies must con-
verge to the Walrasian price at no slower than linear convergence rate.
Corollary 8 Fix κB,κ S > 0 and r ≥ 0. For any sequence of nontrivial steady-state equilib-
ria parametrized by τ such that τ → 0, the price interval [pBτ, ¯ pSτ] and acceptance interval












Proof: It follows from (27) that the marginal participating types v and ¯ c must be on
diﬀerent sides of the Walrasian price p∗, i.e. either ¯ c ≤ p∗ ≤ v or v ≤ p∗ ≤ ¯ c.T h u sL e m m a
4i m p l i e st h a tp∗ must always fall within the acceptance interval, i.e. p∗ ∈ (c, ¯ v).F i n a l l y ,
Theorem 5 gives the claim. Q.E.D.
175 Rate Optimality
To provide a benchmark for our results, we deﬁne traders’ Walrasian utilities in the usual
manner, as
W∗
B (v)=m a x {v − p∗,0},W ∗
S (c)=m a x {p∗ − c,0}.














The following lemma shows that the traders’ interim payoﬀsc o n v e r g en os l o w e rt h a n
the length of acceptance interval ¯ v − c.
Lemma 9 In any nontrivial steady-state equilibrium, |W∗
i (v) − Wi(v)| < ¯ v−c for i = B,S.
Proof. We will only prove the result for buyers. That for sellers can be proved by a
symmetric argument. Observe that if v ≥ v then WB(v)=v − ˜ v(v);a n di fv<vthen
WB(v)=0 .C o n s e q u e n t l y ,
WB(v) − W∗




p∗ − ˜ v(v) if v ≥ v and v ≥ p∗
v − ˜ v(v) if v ≥ v and v<p ∗
p∗ − v if v<vand v ≥ p∗
0 if v<vand v<p ∗
.




{|˜ v(v) − p∗| : v ∈ AB} < ¯ v − c.
Q.E.D.
Combine Lemma 9 and Theorem 5, we obtain the following rate of convergence theorem
for interim utilities.
Theorem 10 (Rate of convergence for interim utilities) Fix κB,κ S > 0 and r ≥ 0.
Then the interim utilities WBτ(v), WSτ(c) converge to their Walrasian counterparts W∗
B (v)
and W∗
S (c) at least as fast as linear rate, as τ → 0.M o r ep r e c i s e l y ,
|W∗
B(v) − WBτ(v)|,|W∗







Remark 11 In Theorem 10, absolute values for both W∗
B(v)−WBτ(v) and W∗
S(c)−WSτ(c)
are needed because they are not guaranteed to be positive. Indeed, if vτ <p ∗,t h e nb u y e r s
with type v ∈ (vτ,p ∗] would have strictly positive utilities in equilibrium but have 0 Wal-
rasian utilities. We also do not have a positive lower bound for 1
τ |W∗
B(v) − WBτ(v)| and
1
τ |W∗
S(c) − WSτ(c)|. Indeed, for some types v, we could have W∗
B(v)=WBτ(v)=0 .
18Our baseline model assumes a take-it-or-leave-it bargaining game. But the treatment
can be straightforwardly extended to any bargaining protocol as long as traders’ types are
private information. In particular Lemma 2 holds for the double auction bargaining protocol
as well, although, as shown later, our convergence results fail for arbitrary protocol.
We now show that no bargaining mechanism can converge at a faster rate, regardless
of whether information is full or private. Any bargaining game played in each meeting
results in a trading probability q(v,c) and payment t(v,c) from the buyer to the seller, as
functions of traders’ types. In steady-state equilibrium, the bargaining outcomes q and t are
unchanged over time. Then buyers’ and sellers’ utilities under this bargaining mechanism
are again given by the recursive equations (11) and (17),a sl o n ga sw er e d e ﬁne qB, qS, ΠB











ΠB(v) ≡ qB(v)v − tB(v), ΠS(c) ≡ tS(c) − qS(c)c,
where qB (v) and qB (c) are, as before, the expected probabilities of trade; tB (v), tS (c) are
the expected payments; and ΠB(v) and ΠS(c) are, again as before, the expected bargaining
proﬁts. Let χB(v) and χS(c) be the buyers’ and sellers’ entering probabilities respectively.
Individual rationality requires
 B[qB(v)v − tB(v)] ≥ κB if χB(v) > 0,
 S[tS(c) − qS(c)c] ≥ κS if χS(c) > 0.
(34)
The ex-ante utilities of traders in any such mechanism (including the take-it-or-leave-it














We now prove that no individually rational bargaining mechanism can have a faster-
than-linear rate of convergence, by establishing an explicit lower bound on W0∗ − W0.
Theorem 12 For any individually rational bargaining protocol, in steady-state equilibrium
we have
W0∗ − W0 ≥ τ · μ · min
ζ>0
K (ζ), (36)
where μ is the equilibrium mass of buyers (or sellers) that enters the market per unit of
time.




























Then the total surplus W0 = bW0
B + sW0
S for this mechanism can be bounded as follows.
For all active buyer types v (i.e. χB(v) 6=0 ),  B[qB(v)v − tB(v)] ≥ κB,s of r o m(12),w e
have for those v:
WB (v)=
 B[qB(v)v − tB(v)] − κB
r +  BqB(v)
≤









Similarly, for all active seller types c,



































(In the second line, we used qB(v) ≤ 1 and qS(c) ≤ 1.) In view of (37), the terms on
the right hand side of the ﬁrst line do not exceed the Walrasian surplus W0∗.A l s o ,s i n c e
the steady-state condition implies that bχB(v)dF(v)=B BqB(v)dΦ(v) and similarly for





the last line in (38) is 0.
Taking all these into account, we have






























= τ · K (ζ) ≥ τ · min
ζ>0
K (ζ).
(36) in the statement of the proposition follows. Q.E.D.
As τ → 0,w em u s th a v eμτ → sG(p∗) whenever W0
τ → W0∗. We therefore have the
following corollary.
Corollary 13 No individually rational bargaining mechanism can attain a faster-than-
linear convergence rate for the traders’ total ex-ante surplus W0
τ as τ → 0.
It follows that baseline mechanism is worst-case asymptotic optimal. The intuition for
why no other bargaining mechanism can attain a faster rate for the ex-ante surplus is that
matching delays will still be present regardless of the eﬃciency of bargaining. Even if only
the buyers with v ≥ p∗ and sellers with c ≤ p∗ enter and always trade to full eﬃciency,
there still will be welfare loss at rate τ because of costly participation (and discounting),
since the expected time between matches is proportional to τ.
Remark 14 Since Theorem 12 does not require incentive compatibility, it in particular
implies that even with full information, as in Mortensen and Wright (2002), convergence
cannot be faster than linear.
Remark 15 Theorem 10 and Theorem 12 together imply that the traders’ total ex-ante
surplus W0
τ in our baseline model converges to W0∗ at exactly linear rate as τ tends to 0.
6R e s u l t s f o r k-Double Auction
It is interesting to know if convergence, or more strongly convergence at the linear rate, can
be proved for other bargaining mechanisms. Although we have not been able to prove a
general characterization theorem in this direction, we have a theorem showing that another
well-studied trading mechanism, the double auction, does not have robust convergence
properties. In other words, some equilibria do not converge to perfect competition.
Recall the rules of the bilateral k-double auction: once a meeting occurs, the buyer
and the seller simultaneously and independently submit a bid price pB a n da na s kp r i c epS
respectively, and then trade occurs if and only if the buyer’s bid is at least as high as the
seller’s ask, at the weighted average price (1 − k)pS + kpB,w h e r ek ∈ (0,1).
We maintain the notation as before except that the interpretations for ˜ v(v), ˜ c(c), pB(v)
and pS(c) are now diﬀerent. In the k-double auction, the strategies pB(v) and pS(c) are the
strategies of submitting bids and asks respectively to the auctioneer. There is no responding
strategies under double auction, but we still interpret ˜ v(v) and ˜ c(c) as dynamic types.
21The deﬁnition for nontrivial steady-state equilibria can be obtained as a straightforward
revision of the take-it-or-leave-it oﬀering case. In particular, Lemma 2 still holds here. The









[kpB (v)+( 1− k)pS (c)]dΓ(c).
As in the take-it-or-leave-it oﬀering case, a k-double auction equilibrium could be either
full-trade or non-full-trade. We claim that the full-trade class of double auction equilibria
includes equilibria that are very ineﬃcient, even with arbitrarily small frictions. (But at
the same time, this class also includes equilibria that converge to perfect competition.)
The set of full-trade equilibria is even easier to characterize for the double auction case.
In particular, from Lemma 2, the active sets AB, AS of types are still intervals [v,1] and
[0,¯ c] for some marginal types v and ¯ c; and we also have ˜ v(v) <vand ˜ c(c) >cfor all v>v
and all c<¯ c. Since all active traders’ trading probabilities are strictly positive, they must
in equilibrium submit serious bids/asks, and therefore, we must have pB(v) ≤ ˜ v(v) <v
and pS(c) ≥ ˜ c(c) >cfor all v>vand all c<¯ c. Now it is clear that for an equilibrium to
be full-trade, we must have ¯ c ≤ v, and all traders submit a common bid/ask p and hence
every matched pair trades at the price p. Clearly, the bargaining outcome of this class of
equilibria is ex-post eﬃcient, in the sense that every meeting results in a trade if and only
if ˜ v(v) ≥ ˜ c(c).F u r t h e r m o r e ,v-buyers and ¯ c-sellers have to recover their participation costs,
thus in any full-trade equilibrium we have ¯ c<p<vfor some p ∈ (0,1). See Figure 4.
Any full-trade equilibrium for the double auction case must satisfy the following entry
equations and mass balance equation:
 B (ζ,τ)(v − p)=κB, (39)
 S (ζ,τ)(p − ¯ c)=κS, (40)
b[1 − F (v)] = sG(¯ c). (41)
Unlike the take-it-or-leave-it oﬀering case19, it is easy to see that the converse is also true,
i.e. any quadruple {p,ζ,v,¯ c} satisfying (39), (40), (41) and τ ·K (ζ) < 1 must characterize
a full-trade equilibrium. In particular, any trader’s best-response bid/ask strategy is p,
given that all other active traders submit p.20
From equations (39) and (40), it follows that the entry gap is
v − ¯ c = τ · K (ζ). (42)
The next proposition shows that v − ¯ c can be arbitrary close to 1 for all τ (such that
an equilibrium exist), so that equilibrium outcomes are arbitrary far from eﬃciency even
19see footnote 16.
20Similar logic implies that a full-trade equilibrium continues to be characterized by equations (39)-(41)









Figure 4: A full-trade equilibrium under double auction
with small frictions. The set of equilibrium entry gaps converges to the full-range (0,1)
as frictions disappear, so the set of full-trade equilibria ranges from perfectly competitive
to almost perfectly ineﬃcient. Moreover, the set of equilibrium prices also converges to
the full-range (0,1) as frictions disappear. Thus indeterminacy grows rather vanishes with
competition, contrary to the results in the static double auction literature.
Proposition 16 A full-trade equilibrium exists if and only if the minimal equilibrium entry
gap v − ¯ c is less than 1:
τ · min
ζ>0
K (ζ) < 1. (43)
The set of equilibrium values of v−¯ c in full-trade equilibria is an interval [τ·minζ>0 K (ζ),1).
As τ → 0, this set and the set of equilibrium prices converge to (0,1) In particular, there
exists a sequence of full-trade equilibria that converges to perfect competition, but also se-
quences that do not converge.
Proof: The proof follows the graphical argument shown in Figure 5. Given τ,t h er i g h t
panel shows the marginal types v and ¯ c in a steady-state equilibrium. The left panel shows
the supportable values of the market tightness ζ and ¯ ζ that correspond to the given gap
v − ¯ c<1. (In general, there can be one, two or more such values.)
Our assumption limB→0 M (B,S)=l i m S→0 M (B,S)=0implies limζ→∞  B (ζ)=
limζ→0  S (ζ)=0 .I ti nt u r ni m p l i e s
lim
ζ→0
K (ζ)= l i m
ζ→∞
K (ζ)=∞, (44)
as depicted in the left panel.
Given that (44) holds, a solution ζ to the equation τK(ζ)=v − ¯ c exists if and only
if v − ¯ c ∈ [τ · minζ>0 K (ζ),1).S i n c elimτ→0 τK(ζ)=0for any ζ>0,w ea l s om u s th a v e
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Figure 5: Construction of a double auction full-trade equilibrium
τ · minζ>0 K (ζ) → 0 as τ → 0. It proves that the set of supportable entry gap v − ¯ c
converges to the interval (0,1).
Now ﬁxa n yτ such that τ ·minζ>0 K (ζ) < 1. Consider the longest interval [ζ0,ζ1] such
that τK(ζ0)=τK(ζ1)=1and τK(ζ) < 1 for ζ ∈ (ζ0,ζ1). For any ζ ∈ (ζ0,ζ1), v and ¯ c
can be found uniquely from (42) and (41) (graphically shown in Figure 5). Denote vτ (ζ)
and ¯ cτ (ζ) as the results. The equilibrium price p can also be found uniquely from equation
(39) or equation (40):








This formally deﬁnes a continuous mapping pτ (·) of [ζ0,ζ1] into R+.C o n s e q u e n t l y ,i t si m a g e
is a closed interval that contains the points p(ζ0) and p(ζ1); and the set of supportable
equilibrium price contains this interval. The deﬁnitions of ζ0 and ζ1 imply that ζ0 → 0
and ζ1 →∞as τ → 0.N o w¯ cτ (ζ1)=0for all τ and  S (ζ1,τ) →∞as τ → 0, therefore
(45) implies that limτ→0 pτ (ζ1)=0 . Similarly, vτ (ζ0)=1for all τ and  B (ζ0,τ) →∞as
τ → 0,s ot h a t(46) implies that limτ→0 pτ(ζ0)=1 . It proves that the set of supportable
equilibrium price converges to (0,1). Q.E.D.
It is not hard to see that the condition τ · minζ>0 K (ζ) < 1 is also necessary for any
nontrivial steady-state equilibrium to exist. We thus have the following corollary.
Corollary 17 There exists a nontrivial steady-state equilibrium (either full-trade or non-
full-trade) if and only if τ · minζ>0 K (ζ) < 1.
24Proof: Having Proposition 16, it now suﬃces to claim the necessity of κB/ B(ζ,τ)+
κS/ S(ζ,τ) < 1 for a nontrivial equilibrium to exist. Recall the notation for a general



















(v − c)dΦ(v)dΓ(c) < 1.
Q.E.D.
Remark 18 This necessary and suﬃcient condition is weaker than the one under take-it-
or-leave-it oﬀering, which is τ · K (z) < 1, as shown in Shneyerov and Wong (2007).
Proposition 16 shows that the set of double-auction equilibria, even if we restrict at-
tention to the full-trade ones, is very large. For more intuition, re-write the ﬁrst two
characterizing equations of the double-auction full-trade equilibrium in a parallel way to
the baseline model:
 B (ζ,τ)(1− αDA)(v − ¯ c)=κB,
 S (ζ,τ)αDA(v − ¯ c)=κS,
where
αDA ≡
p − ¯ c
v − ¯ c
is what we may call the relative bargaining power under double-auction full-trade equilib-
rium. These equations are the same as the ﬁrst two equations (25) and (26) that characterize
a full-trade equilibrium in our benchmark model, with the only diﬀerence that the exoge-
nous bargaining power α is now replaced with the endogenous bargaining power αDA.( T h e
remaining mass balance equation is the same in both models.) If αDA = α, the equilibria in
both models have the same marginal types v and ¯ c, and once these are solved for, the price
p is uniquely determined from the equation αDA = α, or equivalently p =¯ c +( v − ¯ c)α.
In other words, to any α ∈ (0,1) there corresponds a double-auction full-trade equilibrium
with αDA = α and the same marginal types v and ¯ c as in a take-it-or-leave-it full-trade
equilibrium.21
The above discussion has the following two implications. First, since αDA can be ar-
bitrary, in the double auction model, there is a great multiplicity of equilibria.22 Second,
since we know that full-trade equilibria of the take-it-or-leave-it game converge at the linear
rate, it follows immediately that there is a sequence of double-auction equilibria that also
converges at the linear rate to perfect competition. We state this ﬁnding as a corollary.
21Rigorously speaking, we should say “the solution of (25)-(27)” instead of “the take-it-or-leave-it full-
trade equilibrium”, because this solution might not be an equilibrium. See footnote 16.
22T h en a t u r eo fi n d e t e r m i n a c yh e r ei sa n a l o g o u st ot h a ti nt h eN a s hd e m a n dg a m e . A si sw e l l - k n o w n ,
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Figure 6: A two-step equilibrium that fails to converge
Corollary 19 There are double-auction full-trade equilibria that converge, in terms of the
ex-ante utilities, at the linear rate in τ.
The above discussion explains why double auction full-trade equilibria can have non-
Walrasian limit while it cannot be the case in the take-it-or-leave-it oﬀering analogue. But
Figure 5 and the logic in the proof of Proposition 16 also make clear that for the double
auction full-trade equilibria to be non-convergent to Walrasian limit, we have to let the
bargaining power of one side vanish (i.e. either v − p → 0 or p − ¯ c → 0 as τ → 0)a n d
also let the market become unbalanced (i.e. either ζ → 0 or ζ →∞as τ → 0). One might
wonder if all equilibria (e.g. non-full-trade) will converge to the Walrasian outcome if we
preclude that class of equilibria, which is perhaps a natural assumption to make. It turns
o u tt h a tt h i si sn o ts o ,a sw es h o wn e x t .
We construct a non-full-trade equilibrium of the following nature (see Figure 6). There
are two seller cutoﬀ types ˆ c ∈ (0,1) and ¯ c ∈ (0,1) with ˆ c<¯ c, and two buyer cutoﬀ types
ˆ v ∈ (0,1) and v ∈ (0,1) with ˆ v>v . The sellers with c ∈ [0,ˆ c) enter and submit pS(c)=p,
where p is some constant strictly below p∗. The sellers with c ∈ [ˆ c,¯ c] enter and submit
pS(c)=¯ p,w h e r e¯ p>p ∗.T h es e l l e r sw i t hc ∈ (¯ c,1] do not enter. Similarly, the buyers with
v ∈ (ˆ v,1] enter and submit ¯ p, the buyers with v ∈ [v, ˆ v] enter and submit p, and the buyers
with v ∈ [0,v) do not enter. We call the equilibria of this kind two-step equilibria.
The following theorem gives our non-convergence result for the two-step (non-full-trade)
equilibria.23
Theorem 20 For any a ∈ (0,1),t h e r ee x i s tr0 > 0, τ0 > 0 and ¯ W<W 0∗ such that for all
r ∈ [0,r 0) and τ ∈ (0,τ0), there exists a two-step equilibrium in which the price spread is
larger than a, i.e. ¯ p−p >a , and the total ex-ante surplus is smaller than ¯ W, i.e. W0 < ¯ W.
23As a by-product, we also prove the existence of non-full-trade equilibrium for small τ and r.
26Proof: We derive a system of equations characterizing the set of two-step equilibria.
But before doing so, it is convenient to introduce some notations. In a two-price equilibrium,
the buyers with v>ˆ v who submit the high bid price ¯ p, trade with any seller they meet.
Buyers with v ∈ [v, ˆ v], who submit the low bid price p, trade only with those sellers with
c<ˆ c, who submit p; their probability of trading is equal to Γ(ˆ c). Similarly sellers with
c<ˆ c trade with any buyer they meet, and sellers with c ∈ [ˆ c,¯ c] t r a d eo n l yw i t ht h o s e
buyers with v>ˆ v; their probability of trading is equal to 1 − Φ(ˆ v).
In our constructed equilibria Γ(ˆ c) and 1 − Φ(ˆ v) will converge to 0 as τ goes to 0,s oi t
is convenient to divide them by τ:
πB ≡






Since v-buyers and ¯ c-sellers are indiﬀerent between entering or not, we have
 BτπS(v − p)=κB (47)
 SτπB(¯ p − ¯ c)=κS. (48)
Since ˆ v-buyers are indiﬀerent between biding p or ¯ p,a n dˆ c-sellers are indiﬀerent between
asking p or ¯ p,w eh a v e
τπS[˜ v(ˆ v) − p]=τπS
©
˜ v(ˆ v) − [(1 − k)p + k¯ p]
ª
+( 1− τπS)[˜ v(ˆ v) − ¯ p] (49)
τπB[¯ p − ˜ c(ˆ c)] = τπB
©
[(1 − k)p + k¯ p] − ˜ c(ˆ c)
ª
+( 1− τπB)[p − ˜ c(ˆ c)]. (50)
Since the utility equations (21), (22) still hold here, we have








where we denoted ˆ WB ≡ WB (ˆ v) and ˆ WS ≡ WS (ˆ c).
To complete the description of the two-step equilibrium, the indiﬀerence conditions are
supplemented with steady-state mass balance conditions for each interval of types. Here, it
suﬃces to require that the total inﬂows into the intervals [v,1] and [0,¯ c] are balanced with
outﬂows,
b[1 − F (v)] = Sm(ζ)[πS + πB (1 − τπS)], (53)
sG(¯ c)=Sm(ζ)[πB + πS(1 − τπB)] (54)
and that the inﬂows into the intervals v ∈ [ˆ v,1] and [0,ˆ c] are also balanced with outﬂows,
b[1 − F(ˆ v)] = Sm(ζ)πB, (55)
sG(ˆ c)=Sm(ζ)πS. (56)
(Observe that the matching rate is Sm(ζ)/τ for both buyers and sellers, and that τ cancels
out.) We also deﬁne the price spread,
a0 ≡ ¯ p − p.
27Then equations (47) through (56) form a 10-equation system with 12 endogenous vari-
ables {p,a 0,ζ,v,¯ c,ˆ v,ˆ c,πB,πS,S, ˆ WB, ˆ WS}. This system does characterize an equilibrium.
Indeed, one can easily see that buyers with v ∈ (ˆ v,1] strictly prefer to bid ¯ p, buyers with
v ∈ (v, ˆ v) strictly prefer to bid p, and buyers with v ∈ [0,v) strictly prefer not to enter.
Similar remark applies for sellers.
Since we have two degrees of freedom, we can ﬁxs o m eζ>0 and a0 ∈ (a,1) and then
let equations (47) - (56) determine {p,v,¯ c,ˆ v,ˆ c,πB,πS,S, ˆ WB, ˆ WS}. We claim that solution
exists for small enough τ and r. To see this, one can check that when τ = r =0 ,w eh a v ea
(unique) solution with p implicitly determined by b[1 − F(p + a0)] = sG(p),a n da l lo t h e r
variables given by










1 − F(ˆ v)=





, ˆ WB =ˆ v − ¯ p, ˆ WS = p − ˆ c.
One can also check that the Jacobian evaluated at τ = r =0is not zero.24 Therefore
the Implicit Function Theorem applies. Because ¯ p − p ≡ a0 >a , there exists a two-step
equilibrium with ¯ p − p >awhen τ and r are small enough. Moreover, since v → ¯ p and
¯ c → p as (τ,r) → (0,0),t h es p r e a dv − ¯ c is also bounded below by a. It follows that
the associated total ex-ante surplus W0 is bounded away from the Walrasian total ex-ante
surplus W0∗. Q.E.D.
Unlike Proposition 16, the construction in the proof of Theorem 20 treats buyers and
sellers symmetrically. In particular, ζ could be ﬁxed at any value. Then why does the
double auction mechanism has non-Walrasian limit equilibria while the take-it-or-leave-
it oﬀering mechanism does not? One can verify that the dynamic types do collapse to
singletons even in the two-step non-convergent equilibria. Thus to ﬁx the idea, let us
simply suppose the discount rate r is 0 so that the ultimate trading probabilities are 1
and therefore the dynamic types are constant and equal ˜ c =¯ c → p and ˜ v = v → ¯ p.A l s o
suppose τ is very small. Then all buyers have dynamic types approximately p and all sellers
have dynamic types approximately ¯ p. Unlike under take-it-or-leave-it oﬀering, the dynamic
types are no longer the acceptance levels. Eﬀectively the bids/asks also play this role. A
seller submitting an ask lower than the dynamic types of all buyers does not guarantee
herself a successful trade. To guarantee a trade, she has to ask lower than all buyers’ bids.
Consider a seller with c<ˆ c. This seller’s equilibrium ask price is p. She realizes fully
that the buyer’s dynamic willingness-to-pay is always ¯ p approximately, and would like to
demand that much if acceptance is guaranteed, as it would be under the take-it-or-leave-it
oﬀering. However, demanding that much under the double auction protocol runs into the
risk of being countered with the buyer’s bid of p, resulting in no trade. In our equilibrium
with τ small, most of the active buyers bid p. Weighing these trade-oﬀs carefully, the seller
decides to submit p and not ¯ p. Similar logic applies to the buyers.
24The Mathematica
R °
notebook that contains the evaluation of the Jacobian is available at
www.econ.ubc.ca/sart/homepage.htm.
28Now consider a seller with c = p + ε where ε>0 is small. Although her type (or
dynamic type) is signiﬁcantly lower than buyers’ dynamic types, which is ¯ p approximately,
she chooses not to enter even when the expected participation costs incurred to obtain a
meeting is very small as τ becomes very small. It is again because most of the active buyers
bid p, making her prospect of trade meager. Similar logic applies to the buyers.
Finally, to complete our logic, we explain why the fraction of active buyers bidding p
is very high relative to the fraction bidding ¯ p. It is because, in our equilibrium, buyers
bidding p can only trade with those sellers asking p, which makes their outﬂow rate tiny.
On the contrary, buyers bidding ¯ p trade in any meeting. Thus in steady state, the buyers
who bid p accumulate and dominate the buyers’ side of the market. Similar logic applies to
the sellers. These arguments together explain why marginal traders do not enter to quest
the signiﬁcant size of the unexploited surplus v − ¯ c, keeping a positive gap between v and
¯ c.
The rules of the double auction do not provide a tight connection between the dynamic
types and actual acceptance levels as would be the case under the take-it-or-leave-it bar-
gaining. Here, a bid/ask is both an oﬀer and an acceptance level. On the contrary, under
take-it-or-leave-it oﬀering, proposing strategies and responding strategies are separate de-
cisions because traders are clear about who is proposer and who is responder. Ex-post, the
bargaining power is given to one party, and thus well-deﬁned. Therefore the responder is
always held to her acceptance level, which creates strong incentive to enter. Ex-ante, both
parties could have the full bargaining power. Therefore the incentives to enter are evenly
distributed over both sides of the market, driving the marginal participating types close to
each other and to the Walrasian price, and leading to rapid convergence.
7C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
In this paper, we have shown that the take-it-or-leave-it matching and bargaining mech-
anism converges to perfect competition at the linear rate in τ, a number proportional to
the length of the waiting period until the next meeting. No other individually rational
mechanism can attain a faster convergence rate, and some mechanisms have equilibria that
may not be convergent. In particular, we show that the double auction mechanism has
non-convergent equilibria.
One caveat is that the non-convergent examples we have constructed for the double
auction are all quite special in that they require a great deal of coordination among the
traders. Additional assumptions (e.g. continuity of strategies and boundedness of the ratio
of buyers to sellers) could be imposed to restrict the set of equilibria with the purpose of
proving their convergence at the linear rate, but this has not yielded to our eﬀorts. In
addition, allowing a multilateral matching technology may also restore convergence of all
equilibria of the double auction mechanism. Also, we have only explored speciﬁcb a r g a i n i n g
protocols. Characterizing a set of protocols for which the rate of convergence is (optimal)
linear is an open question.25
25In particular, the general techniques recently developed by Lauermann (2006) could be useful.
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